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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between Human Resource Management 
(HRM) practices and workers’ overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. 
To  investigate  these  issues  we  use  British  data  from  the  ‘Changing  Employment 
Relationships,  Employment  Contracts  and  the  Future  of  Work  Survey’  and  the 
‘Workplace Employment Relations Survey’. After controlling for personal, job and 
firm characteristics, it is shown that several HRM practices raise workers overall job 
satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay, but these effects are only significant for 
non-union members. Satisfaction with pay is higher where performance-related pay 
and seniority-based reward systems are in place. A pay structure that is perceived to 
be unequal is associated with a substantial reduction in both non-union members’ 
overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. Although HRM practices can 
raise worker job satisfaction, if workplace pay inequality widens as a consequence 
then non-union members may experience reduced job satisfaction.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning literature on the economics of job 
satisfaction.
1 There is also a large Human Resource Management (HRM) literature 
that emphasises the influence of so-called ‘high-performance workplace practices’ on 
job satisfaction and hence employee performance. The HRM literature can be split 
into  empirical  studies,  which  in  the  case  of  the  UK  are  primarily  based  on  the 
Workplace  Industrial  Relations  Survey  (WIRS)  series,  and  a  considerably  larger 
number of studies that typically rely on case study analyses.
2 Relatively few studies 
have sought to combine the job satisfaction and HRM literature. One objective of this 
paper is therefore to present new empirical evidence on the impact of HRM practices 
on workers overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with their pay. Some authors 
claim  that  HRM  practices  are  a  substitute  for  unionisation,  offering  management 
‘…the prospect of improved performance whilst simultaneously improving workers’ 
job  satisfaction,  security  and  perhaps  pay’  (Machin  and  Wood,  2004).  A  second 
objective  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  HRM  practices  have  a  different 
impact on the job satisfaction of union members as opposed to non-union members.  
 
There is a longstanding interest, especially amongst economists, in the role played by 
pay  and  reward  structures  in  determining  worker  effort,  performance  and  job 
satisfaction. However, the focus of the existing literature has tended to be on the 
impact  of  workers’  own  pay  or  their  comparison  wage.  Little  is  known  beyond 
particular cases about the impact of the distribution of pay within a firm on worker 
                                                 
1 See, for example Clark (1996), Oswald (1997),  Robie et al (1998), Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), 
Clark (2001), Gazioglu and Tansel (2003), Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora (2003) or Nguyen, Taylor 
and Bradley (2003). 
2 Kling (1995), Ichniowski et al (1996) and Ichniowski et al (1997), Black and Lynch (1997), Leigh 
and Gill (1999), Appelbaum et al (2000), and Delaney and Goddard (2001) are examples for the US,   4 
performance. This is intriguing because there is a growing literature, which fervently 
advocates the implementation of contingent, and implicitly variable, pay structures 
that encourage wage dispersion.
3 A third objective of this paper is therefore to analyse 
the impact of perceived pay inequality on workers’ job satisfaction. 
 
To  investigate  these  issues  we  analyse  two  British  datasets,  the  ‘Changing 
Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future of Work Survey’ 
(CERS), conducted in 2000, and the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS). The CERS and the WERS datasets differ in that the former has a larger 
proportion  of  workers  from  small  firms  (i.e.  those  with  less  than  10  employees), 
whereas  the  WERS  excludes  establishments  with  fewer  than  10  employees.  This 
means that WERS excludes 73% of the 1.3 million establishments in the UK (Cully et 
al,  1999).  However,  WERS  covers  82%  of  employees,  which  means  that  it  is 
representative of employees whereas CERS is representative of establishments. These 
two datasets can thus be seen as complements in our analysis. To allow a comparison 
of the findings from these two datasets we construct a set of covariates that are as 
consistent as possible.  In terms of HRM practices, we identify the following sets of 
variables: work organisation, supervision, employee involvement/voice, recruitment 
and  selection,  training  and  learning,  and  pay  practices.  In  addition,  we  include 
variables for the workers’ perception of pay inequality in the workplace and whether 
it is unionised.  Note that our comparison of the two datasets can only be performed 
with respect to the workers’ satisfaction with their pay, since the WERS dataset does 
not include a variable for overall job satisfaction.   
                                                                                                                                            
whereas British research includes Heywood et al (1997), Poole and Jenkins (1998), Whitfield (2000), 
Addison et al (2000) and Addison et al (2001), Delbridge and Whitfield (2001). 
3 However, evidence on the incidence of these practices has been continuously accumulating in the UK, 
US and other countries (Addison and Belfield, 2001; Arthur 1992; Bailey et al 2001; Osterman, 1994; 
Pfeffer, 1998; and Wood, 1999).   5 
The remainder of the paper is broken down as follows. In section 2 we briefly review 
the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  job  satisfaction  and  then  discuss  the 
literature on the impact of HRM practices on worker performance. The issue of pay 
inequality is also introduced. Section 3 describes the two datasets used in the analysis 
together with our econometric methodology. In section 4 we discuss the findings of 
our analysis of the impact of HRM practices on workers’ overall satisfaction and that 
with pay. This section then examines the differences in outcome between union and 
non-union members, followed by a discussion of the impact of pay inequality. Our 
conclusions follow in section 5. 
 
2.  Job satisfaction and HRM practices: theory and literature 
 
Various  theories  of  job  satisfaction  have  been  developed  by  psychologists  and 
management scholars. They tend to assign various degrees of importance to sources of 
satisfaction, which can be classified as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic sources 
depend on the individual characteristics of the  person, such  as attitudes. Extrinsic 
sources are situational, and depend on the environment, such as workplace climate. 
Theories which rely on extrinsic sources are more typically adopted by economists, 
albeit  using  different  terminology,  whereas  intrinsic  sources  are  more  commonly 
associated  with  other  social  sciences  (Luchak,  2003).  Extrinsic  theories  also  have 
deep roots in the social sciences, and can be traced back, for instance, to Herzberg 
(1959)’s  hygiene-motivation  theories,  who  develops  two  distinct  sets  of  factors 
influencing motivation and satisfaction. One set of factors is called ‘motivators’ (i.e., 
job factors that are work related). These factors are: recognition, achievement, the 
possibility for growth and advancement, the level of responsibility and the nature of 
the work itself. Secondly, ‘hygiene’ factors, which are not directly related to the job   6 
itself, are also important and relate to the conditions that surround doing that job. 
These include salary, technical support, company policy and administration, working 
conditions,  status,  job  security,  and  interpersonal  relationships  among  supervisors, 
subordinates and peers. As an aside it is interesting to note that this theory suggests 
that pay is not a good motivator, consistent with some weak observed effects of pay 
practices in the empirical job satisfaction literature. 
  
A  further  strand  of  this  theoretical  literature  is  known  as  situational  theory,  an 
example of which is Locke’s value-based theory. According to Clark (1996), this is ‘a 
classic  reference  for  the  meaning  of  job  satisfaction’.  Locke  (1976)  defines  job 
satisfaction as ‘a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal 
of one’s job or job experiences’ (Clark 1996, p190). Finally, Hackman and Lawler 
(1971)  present  an  alternative  facet-based  theory  of  job  satisfaction,  whereby  job 
characteristics,  such  as  task  variety,  autonomy,  feedback,  identity  and  task 
significance influence motivation and job satisfaction.  
 
Traditionally,  economists  have  embraced  job  satisfaction  with  ‘professional 
suspicion’ (Freeman, 1978: 135) because it is a subjective variable, and hence it is not 
surprising  that  the  study  of  job  satisfaction  by  economists  is  ‘still  in  its  infancy’ 
(Blanchflower  and  Oswald,  2000,  p8).  However,  the  empirical  analysis  of  job 
satisfaction either implicitly or explicitly draws on the theoretical models discussed 
above, and in so doing job satisfaction is specified as a function of several individual 
and job characteristics, and interpreted as a utility function (Clark and Oswald 1996; 
Easterlin, 2001; Nguyen, Bradley and Taylor, 2003).  
     7 
Previous research on the determinants of job satisfaction shows that women are more 
satisfied with their jobs than men, possibly a reflection of their lower expectations 
from work, which may in turn be a consequence of their relatively poor position in the 
labour market (Clark 1996, 1997; Groot and Brink, 1999). A U-shaped relationship 
between age and job satisfaction has also been observed (Sloane and Ward 2001; 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2001), and married workers are more likely to report a 
higher  level  of  job  satisfaction  (Blanchflower  and  Oswald  2001).  More  highly 
educated workers report lower levels of job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996), 
possibly  because  job  satisfaction  depends  on  the  gap  between  outcomes  and 
aspirations, and the latter increase with the level of education.  
   
In the HRM literature, a few sociological and psychological studies have focused on 
the effects of job satisfaction on firm and employee performance. The majority of 
these  studies  are  descriptive  and  often  based  on  case  studies  (see  the  reviews  in 
Purcell 1999 and Ramllal 2003), which means that the findings from this research 
cannot  be  generalised.  For  instance,  Truss  2001  analyses  a  single  firm  (Hewlett 
Packard), whereas Rigano and Donna 1998 research the experience of one worker.  
 
Economists  have  also  investigated  the  relationship  between  HRM  practices  and 
company and worker performance, and suggest that these practices have the potential 
to  ‘transform’  organisations  into  being  cost-efficient  and  productive,  whilst  also 
increasing employee well-being. For instance, Huselid (1995) finds that a standard 
deviation  increase  in  ‘high-performance  work  practices’  translates  into  a  seven 
percent decrease in turnover, an increase of $2,700 in sales per employee, a $19,000 
increase in market value and $4,000 rise in profits.  
   8 
 
Some studies by labour economists show that certain HRM practices, such as working 
in teams, greater discretion and autonomy in the workplace and various employee 
involvement and pay schemes, do motivate workers and hence generate higher labour 
productivity (Cully et al, 1999; Boselie et al., 2001). However, overall job satisfaction 
need not increase if effort is a ‘bad’ and rational workers aim is to maximise the 
returns from the exerted effort.  
 
Reward systems have been analysed predominantly by economists, although there are 
relatively few empirical studies (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993). What evidence there is 
on the effects of pay and pay practices is mixed. In terms of the relationship between 
pay and job satisfaction, Clark and Oswald (1996) show that a workers’ reported level 
of well-being is weakly correlated with their income, whereas Belfield and Harris 
(2002) find no evidence of such a relationship for those working in higher education. 
Other studies show that it is relative income rather than own income that matters 
(Hamermesh, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Shields and Price, 2002).  
 
A wider literature exists on the effects of introducing new pay practices in companies, 
although  there  are  few  empirical  studies  and  none  that  address  the  relationship 
between  such  practices  and  job  satisfaction.  The  most  notable  exceptions  on  the 
empirical side are Black and Lynch (2004), Booth and Frank (1999), Cappelli and 
Neumark  (1999)  and  Lazear  (2000).  There  are  also  very  few  studies  that  seek  to 
examine the relationship between the pay distribution within a firm, including the 
perception of that distribution by a worker, and individual worker performance or   9 
their job satisfaction.
4 An exception is Bloom and Michel (2002) who discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of dispersed and compressed ‘actual’ pay structures. 
Dispersed pay structures may induce higher levels of performance as employees have 
to  work  harder  to  move  up  the  pay  ladder.  This  is  consistent  with  the  notion  of 
promoting  the  ‘star’  workers  in  a  competitive  environment  and  the  provision  of 
compensating differentials for high-risk jobs. However, dispersed pay systems may 
also be linked to workforce instability  and higher turnover. The latter effect is in 
accordance with the prediction of tournament theory whereby the winners stay with 
the company in order to compete in further tournaments, but losers are implicitly 
expected to leave or to face truncated careers (Bloom and Michel, 2002). On the other 
hand,  compressed  pay  promotes  team  effort  and  cooperation  by  creating  a  more 
egalitarian workplace, which tends to reduce turnover (Beaumont and Harris, 2003). 
However, it may discourage effort above a certain minimal necessary level, and may 
be  perceived  as  unfair  because  of  being  open  to  free-rider  problems.  Hence,  it  is 
difficult  to  sign  the  effect  of  the  pay  distribution  within  a  firm  on  workers’  job 
satisfaction. 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
 
We use two British datasets for our empirical analysis. The Changing Employment 
Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future of Work Survey (CERS) was 
commissioned by the Policy Studies Institute as part of the Future of Work research 
programme. This data was collected between July 2000 and January 2001, and the 
                                                 
4 The benefits of including subjective (such as perception-based) variables in research have been 
highlighted ever since Freeman (1978) who remarks: ‘while there are good reasons to treat subjective 
variables gingerly, the answers to questions about how people feel toward their job are not meaningless 
but rather convey useful information about economic life that should not be ignored’ (Freeman 1978 : 
135).   10 
main  aim  of  the  Survey  was  to  identify  and  describe  the  key  changes  in  British 
employee  relations.  Two  data  collection  methods  were  used:  interviews  and  self-
completion  questionnaires.  The  one-hour  interviews  were  personal,  paper-based, 
conducted  in  the  home,  and  totalled  2,466.  Self-completion  questionnaires  were 
issued  together  with  the  interviews  and  returned  by  2,349  respondents,  which 
represents a 95-percent response rate. Once we omit respondents with missing values 
on  key  variables  and  the  self-employed  (334),  the  sample  drops  to  1,518.  The 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) contains a much larger sample of 
workers  (19,890  once  we  allow  for  missing  data),  and  has  the  advantage  that 
responses are obtained from both employees and their managers.   
 
An  advantage  of  the  CERS  data  is  that  it  contains  a  question  on  overall  job 
satisfaction,  which  is  reported  in  Table  1.  The  majority  of  the  respondents  to  the 
survey are satisfied with their job, the modal group being ‘satisfied’. The distribution 
of job satisfaction observed in Table 1 is consistent with other British studies and 
shows that the reported levels of satisfaction are very high (Blanchflower et al 1993, 
Millward et al 1999, Oswald and Gardner, 2001). These results may reflect a self-
selection effect insofar as workers sort themselves into the jobs that they like and quit 
those they dislike. However, this explanation over-states workers’ ability to find a 
suitable job match. There are very few observations in some categories and hence we 
collapse the job satisfaction into five discrete categories (see below). 
 
A drawback of the WERS is that it does not contain an equivalent question on overall 
job satisfaction, but instead asks workers about their satisfaction with job autonomy 
and pay. An equivalent question is asked in the CERS on workers’ satisfaction with   11 
pay, and hence we also model the determinants of workers satisfaction with their pay. 
Table 2 compares the means for all covariates for the CERS and the WERS.  
   
Descriptive statistics for all variables constructed from both datasets are shown in 
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Variables for HRM and pay inequality variables 
are  constructed from the questions listed in Table A3 in the Appendix. Table A2 
allows  us  to  compare  the  sample  means  for  the  variables  extracted  from  the  two 
datasets.  It  is  clear  that  the  CERS  has  fewer  professional  workers  and  more 
managerial/intermediate technical workers than the WERS. As noted earlier, there is 
also a clear difference between the CERS and WERS in terms of the distribution of 
employees by firm size, with the WERS having far more respondents in medium-
sized firms (100-499 employees), and no micro-firms (under 10 employees). In terms 
of HRM practices, workers in CERS are less likely to work in teams, get involved in 
improvement groups or be in firms that offer profit-related pay. Conversely, workers 
in  WERS  are  less  likely  to  be  supervised,  or  work  in  firms  that  encourage  both 
training and skill development. The fact that CERS is representative of establishments 
whereas  WERS  is  representative  of  workers  makes  an  analysis  of  both  datasets 
potentially very revealing.  
  




u INEQUALITY HRM X S + ′ + ′ + ′ = 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 β β β β β β β β β β β β 2       (1) 
   
                                                 
5 Note that an identical specification is adopted for satisfaction with pay.   12 
where X refers to a vector of worker, job and firm characteristics, including whether 
the  worker  is  a  union  member.  Worker  characteristics  include  their  age,  gender, 
marital status, number of children, and highest educational qualification, whereas the 
job and firm characteristics include the workers occupation/skill level and firm size. 
Unlike  the  previous  literature  a  vector  of  variables  reflecting  human  resource 
management  practices,  HRM,  are  included  in  the  model  and  classified  under  the 
following  headings:  (i)  work  organisation,  (ii)  supervision,  (iii)  employee 
involvement, (iv) recruitment and selection, (v) training and learning, and (iv) pay 
practices,  including  seniority-based  pay  and  performance-related  pay.  Finally, 
INEQUALITY refers to the workers perception of the pay distribution in the firm and 
in particular whether is regarded as unequal or not. Hamermesh (2004) has warned 
about  the  inclusion  of  subjective  covariates  when  the  dependent  variable  is  itself 
subjective. We defend the inclusion of this particular variable on the grounds that 
perception of pay is probably what is most important within a firm. If the distribution 
of pay is regarded as unequal and this reduces workers’ job satisfaction then either 
management needs to change that distribution by altering its pay practices, or if it is 
based on a misperception of the pay distribution then management needs to improve 
information flows in the firm. 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that job satisfaction is measured on an ordinal scale, however, 
since there is a lack of data on some categories it is necessary to combine them. This 
gives the following classification for overall job satisfaction and for satisfaction with 
pay:  
   
Y = 5 completely / very satisfied  
Y = 4 satisfied    13 
Y = 3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
Y = 2 dissatisfied 
Y = 1 completely / very dissatisfied.  
 
The  same  ordinal  scale  is  adopted  for  satisfaction  with  pay  in  the  CERS  and  the 
WERS. Since job satisfaction is an ordinal variable, we estimate an ordered probit 
model, which assumes that there is an unobserved random variable, Y*, such that: 
 
,
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The observed counterpart to Y* is the categorical variable Y, ordered as follows: 
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where  ij d  = 1 if the ith observation is in the jth job satisfaction category; i=1,2,…,n 
and  j =1,2,…,m. 
   
It is difficult to interpret the estimates from the ordered logit model, therefore we 
report marginal effects along with the p-value on the underlying coefficient estimates. 
 
4.  Results 
 
The effect of HRM practices 
We begin by discussing the effect of HRM practices on overall job satisfaction, which 
are reported in Panel A of Table 3, and then discuss their effect on satisfaction with 
pay. The results in Table 3 show that after controlling for a wide range of personal, 
job and firm characteristics (reported in Panel B, Table 3), several HRM practices 
have a statistically significant effect on job satisfaction.
6 
 
Creating workplaces which embed ‘on-going learning’ has a highly significant effect 
on job satisfaction, insofar as it increases the probability of a worker being either 
completely or very satisfied by sixteen percentage points (see Training and learning). 
This result is consistent with the HRM literature where on-the-job learning figures 
                                                 
6 Since many of the findings for the personal, job and firm characteristics are in keeping with the 
existing literature, we do not dwell on them here.   15 
prominently among practices that enhance employee motivation and commitment. For 
instance, Doeringer et al (1998) find that US companies adopting Japanese workplace 
practices tend to emphasise ‘social and organisational learning’ and to offer career 
employment and high wages. In turn, employees reciprocate by increased effort and 
productivity. Interestingly, the provision of employer provided education and training 
is insignificant, suggesting that workers prefer continuous on-the-job instruction to 
off-the-job training.  
 
In  the  model  for  satisfaction  with  pay  we  construct  training  variables  that  are 
comparable for CERS and WERS (Tables 4 and 5). Firms are classified into those that 
offer either training or continuous skill development, those that offer both training and 
skill development, which are compared to the base firms that offer neither. For CERS 
there  is  no  statistically  significant  relationship  between  the  training  variables  and 
satisfaction with pay (see Table 4), whereas for WERS workers who receive training 
and encouragement do develop skills are more satisfied with their pay (see Table 5). 
Furthermore,  those  workers  who  work  in  firms  that  offer  both  training  and 
encouragement to develop skills are more likely to report that they are ‘very satisfied’ 
or ‘satisfied’ with their pay (compare the marginal effects of 0.17 and 0.08). One 
explanation for the difference in our results between CERS and WERS may be the 
fact that CERS contains a higher proportion of micro firms, which typically offer very 
little training or opportunity for continuous skill development, whereas the WERS 
includes more medium-large firms, who tend to offer more training.       
 
Constant  direct  supervision,  where  the  employee  can  be  seen  all  the  time  by  a 
supervisor  or  a  manager,  has  a  significant  negative  impact  on  job  satisfaction, 
reducing the probability of being completely satisfied by 2.5 percentage points, which   16 
is  offset  by  an  increased  risk  of  being  dissatisfied  (see  Supervision,  Table  3).  In 
contrast, the fact that ‘work progress can be visually assessed’ by a supervisor has a 
small  but  positive  effect  on  job  satisfaction,  increasing  the  probability  of  feeling 
completely or very satisfied by 5 percentage points. Thus, whereas close supervision 
of work is disliked, perhaps because it is associated with a feeling of being controlled, 
workers do like some feedback on their performance, suggesting that some monitoring 
is actually desirable. These findings are consistent with the view that HRM practices 
enhance  employee  participation,  voice  and  creativity,  thereby  increasing  job 
satisfaction, motivation and workplace performance. However, there is no evidence 
from CERS that these variables affect satisfaction with pay (see Table 4), whereas in 
WERS ‘supervision of work progress’ does have a statistically significant and positive 
effect on satisfaction with pay, albeit small in magnitude (see Table 5).    
 
Table 3 shows that teamwork is only significant at the 10% level and although this 
kind  of  practice  increases  job  satisfaction,  the  effects  are  quite  small  (see  work 
organisation). Working in a team increases the probability of being completely or 
very satisfied by only 4 percentage points. The finding that teamwork has little effect 
on job satisfaction is interesting because it is often advocated as one of the most 
important HRM practices (Osterman 1994, MacDuffie 1995, Pfeffer 1995), and has 
been  shown  elsewhere  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  employee  productivity, 
commitment,  and  job  satisfaction  (Griffin  1988,  Banker  et  al  1996,  Batt  and 
Appelbaum  1995).  Our  results  are  perhaps  in  keeping  with  the  behaviour  in 
organisation literature, which warns of the negative effects of increased pressure from 
peers  in  the  team.  Barker  (1993)  speaks  of  ‘concertive  control’,  whereby  the 
management’s supervision is multiplied by peer surveillance. Furthermore, Parker and 
Slaughter (1988) introduce the concept of ‘management by stress’ to conjure up the   17 
effect of Japanese style practices on employee well-being. It is also interesting to note 
from  Tables  4  and  5  that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  relationship  between 
teamwork  and  workers  satisfaction  with  their  pay,  as  one  might  expect  given  the 
findings that workers are more satisfied when their own progress and performance are 
monitored.   
 
Job autonomy is captured in the model for overall job satisfaction in the CERS dataset 
by  the  organisation  of  work  in  such  a  way  that  individual  performance  can  be 
differentiated from that of one’s peers (see Work organisation, Table 3). This variable 
has  borderline  significance  and  has  a  modest  effect  insofar  as  it  increases  the 
probability of a worker being completely or very satisfied by 4.7 percentage points. 
This is a less substantial effect on job satisfaction than has been found for the US
7. In 
the  models  of  satisfaction  with  pay,  job  autonomy  is  reflected  in  the  worker’s 
influence over job tasks, the pace of work and how the job is done. In the CERS, only 
influence over the pace of work has a statistically significant effect on satisfaction 
with pay (Table 4), whereas in the WERS all three measures of work organisation are 
highly significant (Table 5). In general, workers with greater job autonomy are more 
satisfied with their pay, and influence over the pace of work is amongst the larger of 
the effects. For instance, in the WERS, the marginal effects on this variable sum to 
approximately 0.06 for ‘very satisfied’/ ‘satisfied’. In contrast, the equivalent sum for 
influence over how the job is done is only 0.026, implying that workers are happier 
with their pay when they have more control over their level of effort.    
 
                                                 
7 See Nguyen, Taylor and Bradley (2003) who focus specifically on the relationship between job 
autonomy and job satisfaction in Britain. They find that the impact of job autonomy is highly 
statistically significant on all five aspects of job satisfaction: pay, fringe benefits,  promotion prospects, 
job security and (5) importance / challenge of work.    18 
A set of five variables relates to employee involvement or channels through which 
workers  can  voice  their  grievances  or  views  (see  Table  3).  These  employee 
involvement  variables  can  be  placed  on  a  scale  from  the  most  passive  form  of 
involvement  (information  dissemination)  to  the  most  engaging  form  (management 
holds meetings with employees). The idea of an employee involvement ‘continuum’ 
was initially proposed in the Freeman-Lazear model, and has been tested by Addison 
et al (2000). However, many of these variables have an insignificant effect on job 
satisfaction  in  our  model,  the  exception  being  ‘management  holds  meetings  with 
employees’. The variable has a very strong effect in raising job satisfaction increasing 
the probability of a worker being completely or very satisfied by 15 percentage points. 
This finding may reflect a preference amongst workers for a simple and direct channel 
of face to face communication with management.  
 
In the models of satisfaction with pay in Tables 4 and 5 the information dissemination 
variable is disaggregated, increasing in sophistication from ‘notice boards’ to ‘email 
or website’, whereas the same variables are used to reflect employee involvement. 
There  is  some  evidence  that  workers  are  more  satisfied  with  their  pay  the  more 
technologically  sophisticated  the  method  of  information  dissemination  used  in  the 
firm. To see this compare the negative effect on the notice board variable with the 
positive  effect  on  the  email  and  website  variables.  With  respect  to  employee 
involvement, workers are more satisfied with their pay when they are able to meet and 
express their views to managers, and the magnitude of this effect is very similar in the 
CERS and the WERS (see Tables 4 and 5, employee involvement / voice).  
 
The effect of involvement in negotiation regarding initial pay raises workers overall 
job satisfaction (Table 3, recruitment & selection) and, perhaps unsurprisingly their   19 
satisfaction with pay (Tables 4 and 5). What is interesting, however, is the finding that 
the effect of negotiation over initial pay is larger for overall satisfaction, increasing 
the probability of being completely or very satisfied by almost 6 percentage points, 
than it is for satisfaction with pay, where it increases this probability by 3 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that allowing workers to negotiate over initial pay has 
spillover effects insofar as workers are more satisfied with the job as a whole.   
 
The effect of pay practices  
Table 3 shows that seniority-based pay mechanisms, such as pay based on tenure, 
have a significant positive effect on job satisfaction. This is the traditional type of 
payment  practice,  designed  to  maximise  effort  from  the  firm’s  perspective  while 
minimising  risk  for  the  worker.  The  probability  of  being  ‘completely’  or  ‘very’ 
satisfied is increased by 7 percentage points for workers in these firms. Interestingly, 
there is also a positive and statistically significant relationship between ‘pay based on 
tenure’ and satisfaction with pay in the CERS (Table 4) but not in the WERS (Table 
5). The results for the CERS may come as a surprise to the advocates of the ‘new’ 
performance related pay practices, given the dramatic decline of seniority-based pay 
mechanisms  (Ornatowski,  1998).  However,  there  is  contrary  evidence  from  our 
analysis that workers are more satisfied with ‘new’ pay practices, especially when pay 
is related to individual performance. This type of compensation system links rewards 
to  individual  performance  by  comparing  their  achievement  to  the  goals  set  at  the 
beginning of the year. Thus, although individual, team and company performance-
related pay practices have no statistically significant effect on overall job satisfaction 
(see  Performance-  related  pay,  Table  3),  individual  performance-related  pay  does 
increase a workers’ satisfaction with their pay. The effect is larger and more highly 
significant in CERS than in WERS (compare Tables 4  and 5), but is nonetheless   20 
positive in both cases. Similarly, where the firm operates a profit sharing or option 
scheme, worker satisfaction with pay is enhanced.  
 
The observed link between individual performance-related pay and satisfaction with 
pay is consistent with our earlier findings that workers prefer systems when work can 
be  visually  assessed  and  differentiated  from  co-workers.  Why  then  is  there  no 
statistically significant relationship between performance-related pay and overall job 
satisfaction?  The  answer  may  simply  be  that  workers  agree  with  the  principle  of 
relating  effort  to  rewards  but  suffer  disutility  from  effort.  Furthermore,  creating  a 
performance-pay link that is perceived as fair can be problematic, especially in the 
case of subjective performance appraisals where the appraisers may be suspected of 
giving biased judgements (Prendergast, 1999). 
 
In keeping with the existing literature on the determinants of workers’ job satisfaction, 
our  model  for  overall  job  satisfaction  includes  a  variable  reflecting  comparison 
income, albeit one based on the workers own perception of their relative pay. Table 3 
shows that where workers perceive their own pay to be relatively low this reduces 
their  overall  job  satisfaction.  This  is  consistent  with  existing  evidence  (Nguyen, 
Taylor and Bradley, 2003; Clark and Oswald, 1994). In comparison to the estimated 
effects on many  of the  HRM variables,  relative income has a much larger effect, 
reducing  the  probability  of  being  ‘completely’  or  ‘very’  satisfied  by  over  15 
percentage points. Thus, although workers are more satisfied with their pay when it is 
related to tenure and/or a system of performance-related pay, the ‘level’ of pay or the 
additional reward reduces overall job satisfaction. 
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Union versus non-union differences in the impact of HRM practices 
It is possible that the role of unions within the workplace has been replaced by the 
introduction of HRM practices, which have the potential to increase workers’ job 
satisfaction and performance and hence offer competing services to those provided by 
unions.  Although  there  is  some  debate  about  whether  this  substitution has  in  fact 
occurred (Machin and Wood, 2004), it is still possible that workers are more satisfied 
if they can voice their concerns, for instance, via one or more of the HRM practices 
rather than indirectly via a union. Some groups of workers, such as the young, may 
not see a role for unions in resolving workplace disputes regarding pay and practices 
and consequently may not join a union. Therefore, it is appropriate to assess union - 
non-union  member  differences  in  the  effect  of  HRM  practices  on  their  job 
satisfaction.  We  do  this  by  interacting  union  membership  with  the  statistically 
significant HRM practices identified in the previous sections. The estimated models 
are otherwise identical, except for the inclusion of these interaction effects. 
 
A general finding is that, for virtually all of the HRM practices, the main effects on 
job satisfaction are positive and statistically significant, whereas the interaction effects 
between union membership and the HRM practice are either negative or insignificant. 
For instance, workers’ overall job satisfaction (Table 6, employee involvement / voice) 
and their satisfaction with pay (see Tables 7 and 8) is higher where they can voice 
their views via meetings with employers. For satisfaction with pay, the sum of the 
marginal effects for the top two satisfaction categories ranges from 0.05 to 0.06. The 
effect  for  union  members,  reflected  by  the  interaction  effect,  is  negative  and 
insignificant in both the CERS and the WERS. In terms of skill development, it can be 
seen that where the job requires on-going learning (Table 6, Training & learning) or 
where  both  skill  development  and  training  are  encouraged  by  the  firm  (Table  8),   22 
workers’ overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay is much higher. The 
sum of the marginal effects for the two highest categories of overall satisfaction is 
0.16 and is 0.15 for satisfaction with, both large effects. In contrast, the equivalent 
interaction effect for union workers is not significantly different from zero. It is also 
worth  noting  the  positive  and  statistically  significant  effects  of  the  performance-
related  pay  and  the  profit  sharing  variables  for  non-union  members  in  the  CERS 
(Table 7).    
 
One interpretation of these findings is that HRM practices perform similar functions 
for non-union members as unions do for their members through bargaining over pay 
and working conditions. Just as unions are able to successfully negotiate over issues 
regarding pay and conditions of employment on behalf of workers so HRM practices 
play an important role in raising satisfaction with pay for non-union members.   
 
The effect of workplace pay inequality on job satisfaction 
As suggested in the review of the literature there is very little evidence on the impact 
of  the  distribution  of  pay  in  the  workplace  on  job  satisfaction.  Workers  may  be 
concerned  about  inequality  in  the  workplace  simply  out  of  a  sense  of  fairness  or 
natural justice. Alternatively, a highly compressed pay distribution implies that there 
is little opportunity for advancement in the firm. There may also be a difference in 
attitude  regarding  workplace  pay  inequality  between  union  members  and  non-
members, the former being expected to be more egalitarian. 
    
Table 3 shows that after controlling for an individual worker’s perception of being 
low  paid,  we  find  that  a  pay  structure  that  is  perceived  to  be  over-dispersed  is 
associated with lower levels of job satisfaction (see Perceived workplace inequality).   23 
These effects are substantial, especially in those firms where the ‘pay gap is much too 
big’. In these firms the probability of a worker being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied 
is reduced by 15 percentage points. The equivalent figure for firms where the ‘pay gap 
is too big’ is 12 percentage points. A highly dispersed wage structure may therefore 
alienate those workers at the lower end of the job-wage hierarchy because they feel 
under-valued.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  Pfeffer  and  Langton  (1993)  have 
suggested that the best system of pay is one that is based on a mixture of seniority, 
productivity  and  credentials.  This  finding  is  replicated  with  respect  to  workers’ 
satisfaction with pay in the CERS (see Table 4), whereas in WERS the only variable 
we could include is ‘Pay gap is small’ (Table 5). The estimate for this variable is 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the interaction effects of perceived workplace pay inequality 
and union status for the CERS. Our results suggest that it is non-union members who 
are least satisfied with respect to perceived pay inequality in the firm. For instance, 
the  probability  of  non-union  members  being  ‘completely’  or  ‘very  satisfied’  is 
reduced by 18 percentage points for non-union members when the pay gap in the 
workplace  is  perceived  to  be  ‘much  too  big’  (Table  6,  Perceived  workplace 
inequality). Where the gap is perceived to be ‘too big’ the effect falls to -0.16, and 
notice that the effects for union members are positive and insignificant. With respect 
to workers’ satisfaction with pay (Table 7) there is no statistically significant effect of 
the pay inequality variables for union members. In contrast, for a non-union member 
the probability of being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied is reduced by 11 percentage 
points where the pay gap is perceived to be ‘much too big’, compared to 9 percentage 
points where the gap is perceived to be ‘too big’.  
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The findings with respect to perceived pay inequality are interesting insofar as they 
suggest  that  although  many  HRM  practices  raise  workers’  job  satisfaction, 
particularly  amongst  non-union  members,  there  may  be  a  downside.  If  HRM 
practices, especially those related to pay, create a more unequal distribution of pay 
within the firm then workers’ job satisfaction can be substantially reduced. Clearly, it 
is important to know whether this is sufficient to counter the positive effects of the 
HRM  practices,  and  so  whether  pay  inequality  reduces  worker  performance  and 
increases  quit  rates.  Moreover,  it  is  useful  to  assess  whether  the  perception  of 
workplace pay inequality is more important than actual workplace pay inequality. A 
case can be made for either variable, and it can be argued that worker perceptions are 
more relevant where there is imperfect information in the workplace, which is likely 
in larger firms.       
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have investigated the effect of HRM practices on workers’ overall 
job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. After controlling for a large number of 
personal,  job  and  firm-related  characteristics,  we  find  that  HRM  practices  have  a 
statistically significant, and in some cases substantial, effect on workers’ overall job 
satisfaction and on their satisfaction with pay. Specifically, we find that workers enjoy 
on-going learning, job autonomy and working in teams. Close supervision of work is 
disliked, but workers enjoy some visual assessment of their performance, suggesting 
that  some  monitoring  is  desirable.  Furthermore,  giving  workers  a  ‘voice’  through 
employee involvement schemes has a positive effect on job satisfaction. Managers 
who hold regular meetings with  employees to  enable them to  express  their views 
about work have the most substantial effect in raising job satisfaction. Satisfaction   25 
with pay is higher where seniority and individual performance-related schemes are in 
place. When we investigate differences in the effect of HRM practices on the job 
satisfaction of union members and non-members, we find that many of the effects 
positive effects are only important for non-union members, which suggests that HRM 
practices are either a threat or an irrelevance to union members. 
  
Finally, a pay structure that is seen as overly dispersed is associated with low levels of 
job  satisfaction.  These  effects  are  large  and  once  again  only  apply  to  non-union 
members. It can be conjectured that, although HRM practices have a direct positive 
effect in raising workers’ job satisfaction, if these policies also raise pay inequality in 
the  workplace  then  there  may  be  an  offsetting  negative  effect  on  satisfaction  and 
performance. This clearly raises implications for the design and implementation of 
HRM practices, particularly with respect to pay and incentive systems. However, it 
should be noted that we measure the effect of perceived workplace pay inequality, 
rather  than  actual  pay  inequality,  and  it  may  be  that  the  distribution  of  pay  is 
misperceived.  The  implication  would  then  be  that  information  flows  about  pay 
structure  should  be  improved  if  managers  are  concerned  with  their  workers’  job 
satisfaction. 
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TABLES 




Frequency  Percent 
Completely satisfied  230  10.79 
Very satisfied  730  34.24 
Satisfied  831  38.98 
Neither satisfied not dissatisfied  164  7.69 
Dissatisfied  117  5.49 
Very dissatisfied  26  1.22 
Completely dissatisfied  24  1.13 
Total  2, 132   
Note: 10 respondents did not state their level of job satisfaction. 
 
Table 2A The distribution of satisfaction over pay (CERS) 
  Frequency  Percent 
Completely satisfied  59  2.77 
Very satisfied  215  10.08 
Satisfied  976  45.78 
Neither satisfied not dissatisfied  301  14.12 
Dissatisfied  403  18.90 
Very dissatisfied  101  4.74 
Completely dissatisfied  64  3.00 
Total  2, 119  99.39 
Note: Out of the 2,132 respondents in the dataset, for 1 respondent, the question was 
not applicable, and 12 respondents did not state their level of satisfaction with pay. 
 
 
Table 2B The distribution of satisfaction over pay (WERS) 
 
  Frequency  Percent 
Very satisfied  970  3.43 
Satisfied  9,011  31.91 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  6,568  23.26 
Dissatisfied  7,885  27.92 
Very dissatisfied  3,480  12.32 
Total  27, 914  98.84 
Note: 1.16 percent of respondents (326) did not answer the question, or answered ‘I 
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Table 3 (Panel A) The effect of HRM practices and perceived pay inequality on 
overall job satisfaction (CERS) 




Satisfied  Neutral  Dissatisfied 
Work organisation 
Teamwork  0.087  0.015  0.025  -0.018  -0.010  -0.012 
Supervision 
Performance 
differentiated from others 
0.075  0.017  0.030  -0.020  -0.012  -0.015 
Employee can be seen all 














Work progress can be 
visually assessed 
0.041  0.019  0.031  -0.022  -0.013  -0.015 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information dissemination  0.545  -0.008  -0.012  0.009  0.005  0.006 
Employee part of an 
improvement group 
0.805  0.002  0.004  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002 
Formal suggestion scheme  0.220  0.012  0.019  -0.014  -0.008  -0.009 
Management holds 













Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.032  0.023  0.035  -0.027  -0.014  -0.017 
Training & learning 
Employer provided 
education or training    
0.735  0.003  0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002 
Job requires on-going 
learning 
0.000  0.052  0.109  -0.053  -0.044  -0.063 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay based on tenure  0.003  0.028  0.043  -0.033  -0.018  -0.021 
Performance-related pay 
Own performance  0.578  0.006  0.010  -0.008  -0.004  -0.005 
Team performance  0.540  -0.008  -0.014  0.010  0.006  0.007 
Company performance  0.258  -0.014  -0.023  0.016  0.009  0.011 
Profit-share/share option  0.563  0.008  0.012  -0.009  -0.005  -0.006 
Perception of relative income 
Own pay is relatively low   0.000  -0.055  -0.101  0.061  0.041  0.054 
Perceived workplace inequality 
Pay gap is much too big  0.000  -0.049  -0.095  0.053  0.039  0.052 
Pay gap is too big  0.000  -0.043  -0.079  0.049  0.032  0.042 
Sample size  = 1,518 
Log likelihood = -1938.79 
LR chi2(30) = 314.87 
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Table 3 (Panel B) The effect of personal, job and firm characteristics on overall 
job satisfaction (CERS) 
 




Satisfied  Neutral  Dissatisfied 
Age  0.072  -0.006  -0.010  0.007  0.004  0.005 
Age squared  0.090  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Gender (male)  0.000  -0.039  -0.063  0.046  0.026  0.031 
Separated, divorced 
or widowed 
0.728  -0.004  -0.007  0.005  0.003  0.004 
Single  0.073  -0.021  -0.036  0.024  0.015  0.018 
One child  0.257  -0.013  -0.022  0.015  0.009  0.011 
Two children  0.469  -0.009  -0.016  0.011  0.006  0.008 
More than two 
children 
0.522  0.013  0.020  -0.016  -0.008  -0.010 
Degree or higher 
degree 
0.670  0.005  0.008  -0.006  -0.003  -0.004 
A-level or equivalent  0.631  0.007  0.012  -0.009  -0.005  -0.006 
No qualification  0.000  0.055  0.072  -0.065  -0.030  -0.033 
Professionals  0.362  0.018  0.026  -0.021  -0.011  -0.012 
Skilled non-manual  0.518  -0.008  -0.013  0.009  0.005  0.007 
Skilled manual  0.554  0.008  0.013  -0.010  -0.005  -0.006 
Partly skilled/semi-
skilled 
0.475  0.011  0.017  -0.013  -0.007  -0.008 
Unskilled  0.956  0.001  0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
Union member  0.123  -0.016  -0.026  0.018  0.011  0.013 
Permanent part-time  0.001  0.052  0.068  -0.061  -0.028  -0.031 
No permanent job  0.908  -0.002  -0.003  0.002  0.001  0.001 
Employees > 1000  0.350  -0.015  -0.026  0.017  0.011  0.013 
500 – 999  0.672  0.008  0.013  -0.010  -0.005  -0.006 
100 – 499  0.994  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
50 – 99  0.086  -0.026  -0.048  0.029  0.020  0.025 
25 – 49  0.120  -0.022  -0.040  0.025  0.016  0.021 
20 – 24  0.648  0.010  0.015  -0.011  -0.006  -0.007 
11 – 19  0.979  0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
Public sector  0.001  0.041  0.060  -0.048  -0.024  -0.028 
Other   0.852  -0.004  -0.006  0.005  0.003  0.003 
Sample size  = 1,518 
Log likelihood = -1938.79 
LR chi2(30) = 314.87 
Base group: Female, married, high school qualification (i.e. GCE/GCSE), no children, permanent full time 
contract, manager, non-union member, private sector and micro firm (i.e. less than 10 employees).  36 








Satisfied  Neutral  Dissatisfied 
Work organisation 
Teamwork  0.894  0.000  -0.001  -0.002  0.001  0.003 
Supervision 
Supervision of work progress  0.395  0.003  0.007  0.012  -0.004  -0.018 
Employee can be seen all the 
time by supervisor or manager  
0.763  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004  0.001  0.006 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information dissemination  
notice boards  0.095  -0.005  -0.015  -0.023  0.008  0.035 
Newsletter or internal magazine  0.035  -0.007  -0.020  -0.031  0.011  0.048 
email or website  0.458  0.003  0.007  0.012  -0.004  -0.018 
Involvement in decision making 
Improvement groups  0.738  0.001  0.003  0.005  -0.002  -0.007 
formal suggestion schemes  0.852  0.001  0.002  0.003  -0.001  -0.004 
Meetings where employees can 
express their views 
0.001  0.010  0.030  0.056  -0.015  -0.081 
Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.022  0.008  0.022  0.033  -0.012  -0.051 
Training & learning 
Both training and skill 
development are encouraged 
0.540  -0.003  -0.009  -0.014  0.005  0.021 
Either training or skill 
development is encouraged 
0.496  -0.003  -0.009  -0.015  0.005  0.022 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay related to tenure  0.000  0.012  0.033  0.050  -0.018  -0.077 
Performance related pay 
Individual performance  0.001  0.013  0.035  0.048  -0.019  -0.077 
Team performance  0.342  0.004  0.012  0.018  -0.006  -0.028 
Company performance  0.590  -0.002  -0.006  -0.010  0.003  0.015 
Profit sharing / option schemes  0.004  0.014  0.036  0.047  -0.020  -0.076 
Perceived workplace inequality   
Pay gap is much too big  0.000  -0.025  -0.082  -0.203  0.028  0.283 
Pay gap is too big  0.000  -0.021  -0.066  -0.138  0.029  0.196 
Job autonomy- influence over 
job tasks  0.672  -0.001  -0.004  -0.006  0.002  0.010 
pace of work  0.023  0.007  0.021  0.039  -0.011  -0.056 
how job is done  0.351  -0.003  -0.009  -0.014  0.005  0.021 
Union  
Union member   0.964  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.001 
Sample size = 1,496 
Log likelihood = -1,837.78 
LR chi2(51) = 301.48 
The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, occupation, 
contract type, firm size and sector. 
‘Neutral’ refers to ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’. ‘Dissatisfied’ includes: ‘dissatisfied’, ‘very 
dissatisfied’ and ‘completely dissatisfied’. 
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Table 5 The effect of HRM practices and pay practices on satisfaction with pay 
(WERS) 
VARIABLES  P-values  Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied  Neutral*  Dissatisfied  Very 
Dissatisfied 
Work organisation 
Teamwork  0.876  0.000  -0.002  0.000  0.001  0.001 
Supervision 
Supervision of work progress  0.003  0.004  0.023  0.001  -0.015  -0.014 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information dissemination 
Notice boards  0.015  -0.005  -0.027  -0.001  0.017  0.015 
Newsletter or internal magazine  0.952  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Email or website  0.000  0.007  0.038  0.003  -0.025  -0.023 
Involvement in decision making 
Improvement groups  0.367  0.001  0.006  0.000  -0.004  -0.004 
Formal suggestion schemes  0.096  0.002  0.013  0.001  -0.008  -0.008 
Meetings where employees can 
express their views 
0.000  0.007  0.045  0.005  -0.028  -0.029 
Recruitment & selection 
Management asks employees 
about pay 
0.000  0.021  0.099  0.001  -0.066  -0.055 
Training & learning 
Both training and skill 
development are encouraged 
0.000  0.028  0.138  0.004  -0.091  -0.080 
Either training or skill 
development is encouraged 
0.000  0.013  0.070  0.003  -0.046  -0.041 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay related to tenure  0.825  0.000  0.002  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
Performance-related pay 
Performance related pay  0.160  0.002  0.011  0.001  -0.007  -0.007 
Profit sharing/ option schemes  0.170  0.002  0.012  0.001  -0.008  -0.007 
Perceived workplace inequality  
Pay gap is small  0.775  0.002  0.010  0.001  -0.007  -0.006 
Job autonomy - influence over 
job tasks  0.000  0.008  0.045  0.004  -0.028  -0.028 
pace of work  0.000  0.009  0.052  0.005  -0.033  -0.033 
how job is done  0.004  0.004  0.022  0.002  -0.014  -0.014 
Union 
Union member   0.129  -0.002  -0.010  -0.001  0.006  0.006 
Sample size = 19,890 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -27,317.11 
LR chi2(46) = 1,928.30 
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Table 6 Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on overall job 
satisfaction (CERS) 
 




Satisfied  Neutral*  Dissatisfied* 
Work organisation 
Teamwork  0.732  0.004  0.006  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003 
Teamwork (unions)  0.066  0.037  0.054  -0.045  -0.022  -0.024 
Supervision 
Performance differentiated from 
others 
0.107  0.020  0.036  -0.024  -0.014  -0.018 
Performance differentiated from 
others (unions) 
0.579  -0.011  -0.019  0.013  0.008  0.009 
Employee can be seen all the 
time by supervisor or manager  
0.125  -0.017  -0.028  0.020  0.011  0.013 
Employee can be seen all the 
time by supervisor or manager 
(unions)  
0.301  -0.018  -0.033  0.022  0.013  0.016 
Supervision of work progress  0.053  0.022  0.037  -0.027  -0.015  -0.018 
Supervision of work progress 
(unions) 
0.528  -0.012  -0.020  0.014  0.008  0.010 
Employee involvement / voice 
Involvement in decision 
meetings where employees can 
express their views 
0.000  0.051  0.098  -0.058  -0.040  -0.052 
meetings where employees can 
express their views (unions) 
0.442  -0.015  -0.027  0.018  0.011  0.013 
Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.171  0.016  0.026  -0.020  -0.011  -0.012 
Initial pay is negotiable (unions)  0.308  0.025  0.036  -0.031  -0.015  -0.016 
Training & learning 
Job requires ongoing learning  0.000  0.052  0.111  -0.054  -0.045  -0.063 
Job requires ongoing learning 
(unions) 
0.993  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay related to tenure  0.025  0.025  0.040  -0.030  -0.016  -0.019 
Pay related to tenure (unions)  0.715  0.007  0.011  -0.008  -0.004  -0.005 
Perception of relative income 
Own pay is relatively low   0.000  -0.065  -0.123  0.072  0.050  0.066 
Own pay is relatively low 
(unions) 
0.075  0.039  0.053  -0.047  -0.022  -0.023 
Perceived workplace inequality 
Pay gap is much too big  0.000  -0.057  -0.118  0.062  0.048  0.066 
Pay gap is much too big (unions)  0.162  0.036  0.049  -0.043  -0.020  -0.022 
Pay gap is too big  0.000  -0.054  -0.103  0.060  0.042  0.055 
Pay gap is too big (unions)  0.058  0.045  0.060  -0.054  -0.024  -0.026 
Sample size = 1,518 
Log likelihood = -1930.54 
LR chi2(58) = 331.36 
 See footnote to Table 4. 
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Table 7 Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on satisfaction 







Satisfied  Neutral  Dissatisfied 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information dissemination 
notice boards  0.055  -0.007  -0.021  -0.033  0.011  0.050 
notice boards*union  0.336  0.006  0.017  0.026  -0.010  -0.040 
newsletter or internal 
magazine 
0.055  -0.008  -0.022  -0.034  0.012  0.052 
newsletter or internal 
magazine*union 
0.616  0.004  0.010  0.016  -0.005  -0.024 
Involvement in decision making 
meetings where 
employees can express 
their views 
0.001  0.012  0.035  0.066  -0.018  -0.095 
meetings where 
employees can express 
their views*union 
0.331  -0.006  -0.018  -0.032  0.009  0.047 
Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.092  0.007  0.018  0.028  -0.010  -0.043 
Initial pay is negotiable* 
union 
0.591  0.004  0.011  0.017  -0.006  -0.026 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay related to tenure  0.004  0.010  0.028  0.044  -0.015  -0.067 
Pay related to tenure* 
union 
0.404  0.005  0.015  0.022  -0.008  -0.034 
Performance-related  pay 
based on individual 
performance 
0.006  0.013  0.035  0.048  -0.020  -0.077 
based on individual 
performance*unions 
0.872  -0.001  -0.003  -0.005  0.002  0.008 
Profit sharing/ option 
schemes 
0.010  0.015  0.039  0.050  -0.022  -0.081 
Profit sharing/ option 
schemes*union 
0.857  -0.001  -0.004  -0.007  0.002  0.010 
Perceived workplace inequality 
Pay gap is much too big  0.000  -0.026  -0.084  -0.211  0.028  0.293 
Pay gap is much too big* 
union 
0.562  0.004  0.012  0.018  -0.007  -0.028 
Pay gap is too big  0.000  -0.023  -0.070  -0.150  0.031  0.212 
Pay gap is too big*union  0.340  0.007  0.019  0.027  -0.010  -0.042 
Job autonomy – influence over 
pace of work  0.015  0.009  0.028  0.054  -0.014  -0.077 
pace of work*union  0.321  -0.006  -0.019  -0.033  0.010  0.048 
Sample size = 1,496 
Log likelihood = -1,835.13 
LR chi2(61) = 306.79 
See footnote to Table 4.  40 
Table 8: Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on satisfaction 






Satisfied  Neutral  Dissatisfied  Very 
Dissatisfied 
Supervision 
Supervision of work 
progress 
0.010  0.004  0.023  0.001  -0.015  -0.014 
Supervision of work 
progress (unions) 
0.966  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Employee involvement / voice  
Information dissemination 
notice boards  0.019  -0.006  -0.029  -0.001  0.019  0.017 
notice boards (unions)  0.545  0.003  0.014  0.001  -0.009  -0.008 
email or website  0.000  0.006  0.031  0.002  -0.020  -0.019 
email or website (unions)  0.131  0.003  0.017  0.001  -0.011  -0.010 
Involvement in decision making 
formal suggestion schemes  0.441  0.001  0.008  0.001  -0.005  -0.005 
formal suggestion schemes 
(unions) 
0.384  0.002  0.012  0.001  -0.008  -0.007 
meetings where employees 
can express their views 
0.000  0.008  0.051  0.006  -0.032  -0.034 
meetings where employees 
can express their views 
(unions) 
0.219  -0.004  -0.022  -0.002  0.014  0.013 
Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.000  0.024  0.111  0.001  -0.074  -0.061 
Initial pay is negotiable 
(unions) 
0.005  -0.005  -0.031  -0.003  0.020  0.020 
Training & learning 
Both training and skill 
development are encouraged 
0.000  0.026  0.129  0.004  -0.085  -0.075 
Both training and skill 
development are encouraged 
(unions) 
0.154  0.004  0.021  0.001  -0.014  -0.012 
Either training or skill 
development is encouraged 
0.000  0.014  0.074  0.004  -0.048  -0.043 
Either training or skill 
development is encouraged 
(unions) 
0.371  -0.002  -0.012  -0.001  0.008  0.007 
Job autonomy – influence over 
job tasks  0.000  0.009  0.055  0.005  -0.035  -0.035 
job tasks (unions)  0.022  -0.005  -0.027  -0.002  0.017  0.017 
pace of work  0.000  0.006  0.036  0.003  -0.023  -0.023 
pace of work (unions)  0.003  0.007  0.037  0.002  -0.024  -0.022 
how job is done  0.004  0.005  0.030  0.003  -0.019  -0.019 
how job is done (unions)  0.304  -0.003  -0.016  -0.001  0.010  0.010 
Sample size = 19,890 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -27,300.80 
LR chi2(57) = 1,975.98 
See footnote to Table 4.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Sample means and standard deviations, CERS (Overall satisfaction) 
 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Personal characteristics 
Age   39.05  10.60 
Age squared   1636.88  848.87 
Gender (male=1)   0.48  0.50 
Marital status     
Married, living with spouse   0.65  0.48 
Separated, or divorced, or widowed   0.14  0.34 
Single   0.22  0.41 
Number of children under 16 living with respondent     
One child   0.19  0.40 
Two children   0.17  0.38 
More than two children   0.06  0.24 
No children   0.57  0.50 
Highest educational qualification     
Degree or higher degree   0.31  0.46 
A-level (or equivalent)   0.10  0.30 
Less than A-level   0.37  0.48 
no qualification  0.31  0.46 
Level of skill     
Professional  0.10  0.30 
Managerial and technical   0.31  0.46 
Skilled non-manual   0.24  0.43 
Skilled manual   0.19  0.39 
Partly skilled/semi-skilled  0.15  0.36 
Unskilled  0.04  0.20 
Union member  0.31  0.46 
Job characteristics 
Contract status     
Permanent full-time  0.71  0.45 
Permanent part-time  0.20  0.40 
Fixed term, temporary  0.09  0.28 
Firm characteristics 
Size (number of employees)     
> 1000  0.12  0.32 
500 – 999  0.07  0.25 
100 – 499  0.20  0.40 
50 – 99  0.11  0.31 
25 – 49  0.15  0.35 
20 - 24   0.07  0.25 
11 – 19  0.09  0.29 
< 10   0.20  0.40 
Sector     
Public  0.31  0.46 
Private  0.65  0.48 
Other  0.04  0.20   42 
Table A1 (continued) 
  
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Work organisation & supervision 
Working in groups or teams  0.59  0.49 
Individual performance differentiated from peer  0.78  0.41 
Employee can be seen all the time by supervisor or manager  0.50  0.50 
Work progress can be visually assessed  0.53  0.50 
 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information is disseminated in workplace  0.78  0.41 
Employee is part of an improvement group  0.30  0.46 
Workplace has a formal suggestion scheme  0.36  0.48 
Management holds meetings were employees can express their 
views 
0.69  0.46 
 
Recruitment & selection 
Initial pay is negotiable  0.29  0.45 
 
Training & learning 
Education or training  paid by employer in the past 2 years  0.52  0.50 
Job requires on-going learning  0.83  0.38 
 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay is related to tenure  0.40  0.49 
 
Performance-related pay 
   
Incentive payment based on own performance  0.22  0.42 
Incentive payment based on team performance  0.17  0.37 
Incentive payment based on company performance  0.26  0.44 
Participating in a profit-share scheme or share (option) scheme  0.15  0.36 
 
Perception of own pay 
   
own pay is relatively high  0.09  0.29 
own pay is reasonably similar  0.58  0.49 
own pay is relatively low  0.32  0.47 
 
Effect of perceived workplace inequality on performance 
   
pay gap is much too big   0.22  0.42 
pay gap is too big  0.29  0.45 
pay gap is about right  0.45  0.50 
pay gap is too small  0.03  0.18 
pay gap is much too small  0.01  0.07 
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Table A2 Sample means and standard deviations for pay practices 
  CERS  WERS  
  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
HRM PRACTICES             
Work organisation & supervision 
Teamwork  0.60  0.49  0.89  0.31 
Supervision of work progress  0.52  0.50  0.27  0.44 
Constant supervision  0.50  0.50  Na  na 
Employee involvement / voice 
Information dissemination 
Notice boards  0.58  0.49  0.93  0.26 
newsletter or magazine  0.62  0.49  0.75  0.43 
email or website  0.42  0.49  0.49  0.50 
Involvement in decision making 
improvement groups   0.33  0.47  0.50  0.50 
Formal suggestion schemes   0.39  0.49  0.28  0.45 
meetings where employees can 
express their views  
0.71  0.45  0.87  0.34 
Recruitment & selection 
Management asks employees about 
pay 
0.29  0.45  0.27  0.44 
Training & learning 
Both training and skill development 
are encouraged 
0.50  0.50  0.39  0.49 
Either training or skill development 
is encouraged 
0.39  0.49  0.38  0.49 
Neither training nor skill 
development are encouraged 
0.11  0.31  0.23  0.42 
Seniority-based pay 
Pay based on tenure  0.40  0.49  0.52  0.50 
Performance-related pay  Na  Na  0.27  0.44 
 Own performance  0.24  0.43  na  na 
 Team performance  0.19  0.39  na  na 
 Company performance  0.29  0.46  na  na 
Profit sharing/ option schemes  0.17  0.38  0.45  0.50 
Perceived workplace inequality 
Pay gap is small  Na  Na  0.01  0.12 
pay gap is much too big   0.23  0.42  na  na 
pay gap is too big  0.29  0.45  na  na 
pay gap is about right  0.48  0.50  na  na 
pay gap is too small  0.02  0.17  na  na 
pay gap is much too small  0.01  0.07  na  na 
Job autonomy – influence over  
job tasks  0.64  0.48  0.66  0.47 
pace of work  0.79  0.41  0.71  0.45 
how job is done  0.45  0.50  0.85  0.36 
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Table A2 (continued)  
  CERS  WERS 
  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Age 18 – 24  0.08  0.27  0.11  0.32 
25 – 39  0.47  0.50  0.43  0.49 
40 – 49  0.25  0.43  0.26  0.44 
50 or over 50  0.21  0.40  0.20  0.40 
Gender (1=male)  0.50  0.50  0.52  0.50 
Married living with spouse  0.64  0.48  0.70  0.46 
Separated, divorced, or widowed  0.14  0.34  0.08  0.27 
Single  0.23  0.42  0.22  0.42 
No children  0.58  0.49  0.59  0.49 
One child  0.20  0.40  0.30  0.46 
Two children  0.17  0.37  0.11  0.31 
More than two children  0.05  0.23  0.01  0.07 
Degree or higher degree  0.33  0.47  0.28  0.45 
A-level or equivalent  0.10  0.31  0.17  0.38 
Qualification less than A-level  0.36  0.48  0.37  0.48 
No qualification  0.20  0.40  0.19  0.39 
Professional  0.07  0.25  0.18  0.38 
Managerial/intermediate technical  0.34  0.47  0.22  0.42 
Skilled non-manual  0.23  0.42  0.21  0.41 
Skilled manual  0.18  0.39  0.15  0.36 
Partly skilled /semi-skilled  0.14  0.35  0.15  0.36 
Unskilled  0.03  0.18  0.08  0.28 
Union member  0.35  0.48  0.40  0.49 
Permanent full-time contract  0.76  0.43  0.75  0.43 
Permanent part-time  0.17  0.37  0.17  0.38 
Not permanent   0.07  0.26  0.08  0.27 
Firm size (No. of employees)          
> 1000  0.13  0.34  0.05  0.22 
500 – 999  0.08  0.27  0.09  0.28 
100 – 499  0.21  0.41  0.40  0.49 
50 – 99  0.11  0.32  0.19  0.40 
25 – 49  0.14  0.34  0.19  0.39 
20-24  0.06  0.23  0.03  0.18 
10-19  0.09  0.29  0.04  0.21 
1-10  0.18  0.39  na  na 
Public sector firm  0.31  0.46  0.34  0.47 
Private sector  0.65  0.48  0.39  0.49 
Other   0.04  0.21  0.28  0.45   45 
Table A3 Construction of the HRM variables from CERS and WERS  
 
 
Work organisation and supervision 
CER: Teamwork: employee is part 
of a team 
Employee is asked: Excluding any supervisor or manager you work for, 
do you usually work in a group or team with two or more other people? 
WERS: Teamwork incidence in the 
workplace 
HR Manager is asked: What proportion, if any, of [employees in the 
largest occupational group] at this workplace work in formally 
designated teams?  
Coded 1 for teamwork, 0 for no employees working in teams. 
CER: Employee reports that work 
progress can be visually assessed 
Employee is asked: Most of the time, can your supervisor or manager 
tell at a glance how your work is progressing? 
WERS: Supervision of work 
progress used as a practice in the 
workplace  
HR Manager is asked: what are the main methods by which logs are 
made aware of their job responsibilities? 
 Coded 1 for supervision amongst the first three answers to this question 
(i.e. amongst the main three methods used in the organisation). 
CER: Employees report they can be 
seen all the time by supervisor or 
manager  
Employee is asked: Do you carry out your work in a place where you 
can be seen all the time by a supervisor or manager? 
WERS: -  Variable not available in the dataset. 
Employee involvement/ voice 
Information dissemination 
CER: notice boards  Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news of what is 
happening in the organisation by any of the methods on this card? 
notice boards 
WERS: notice boards  Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
notice boards 
Coded 1 if notice boards are used, 0 if notice boards are ‘not used here’ 
CER: newsletter or magazine: 
combination of  
Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news of what is 
happening in the organisation by any of the methods on this card? 
news-sheet, internal newspaper or magazine 
WERS: newsletter or magazine  Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
newsletters or magazines 
Coded 1 if newsletters or magazines are used, 0 if newsletters or 
magazines are ‘not used here’ 
CER: e-mail or website   Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news of what is 
happening in the organisation by any of the methods on this card? 
web-site or internal e-mails 
WERS: e-mail   Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
e-mail 
Coded 1 if notice e-mail is used, 0 if e-mail is ‘not used here’. 
Involvement in decision making 
CER: Employee as part of an 
improvement group 
Employee is asked: Some organisations have groups of employees who 
meet regularly to think of improvements that could be made within the 
organisation. Are you involved in such a group? 
WERS: Incidence of improvement 
groups in the workplace 
HR manager is asked: Do you have groups at this workplace that solve 
specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? They 
are sometimes known as quality circles or problem-solving groups or 
continuous improvement groups. 
CER: Workplace has a formal 
suggestion scheme 
Employee is asked: Does your employer have a formal suggestion 
scheme? 
WERS: Workplace has a formal 
suggestion scheme 
HR manager is asked: Do you have any channels through which 
employees can make suggestions for improving working methods? 
Coded 1 for suggestion schemes.   46 
Table A3 (continued) 
CER: Management holds meetings 
were employees can express their 
views 
Employee is asked: Does management hold meetings in which you can 
express your views about what is happening in the organisation? 
WERS: Management holds 
meetings were employees can 
express their views 
A combination of: 
Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace?  
meetings of managers and employees 
Coded 1 if notice meetings are used, 0 if meetings are ‘not used here’. 
and 
Employee is asked: How good would you say managers here are at the 
following: providing everyone with the chance to comment on proposed 
changes? 
Coded 1 for ‘very good’ and ‘good’, 0 for the rest. 
The combined variable is coded 1 if both variables above are 1. 
Financial involvement, Recruitment & selection 
CER: Employee is part of a profit-
share scheme or share (option) 
scheme 
Employee is asked: Do you participate in profit-sharing scheme or share 
(option) scheme? 
WERS: Incidence of profit-sharing 
scheme or share ownership schemes 
in the workplace 
HR manager is asked: Do any employees at this workplace receive 
payments or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes? 
1. Profit-related payments or bonuses 
2. Deferred profit sharing scheme 
3. Employee share ownership schemes 
Coded 1 if ‘yes’ at any of the three above. 
CER: Initial pay is negotiable  Employee is asked: When you entered your present job, were you able 
to negotiate personally with your employer over the pay they were 
offering you? 
WERS: Frequency of being asked 
about pay issues 
Employee is asked: How often are you and others working here asked 
by managers for your views on the following?  
pay issues 
Coded 1 for frequently and sometimes, 0 for hardly ever and never. 
Training & learning 
CER: Both/ Either/ Neither training 
and skill development are 
encouraged : 
Combination of the variables in the two rows below: 
education or training  paid by 
employer in the past 2 years 
Employee is asked: Have you received any education or training 
provided or paid for by your current employer, in the last 2 years? 
Please include any education or training which is still continuing. 
job requires on-going learning  Employee is asked: Statements about job: My job requires that I keep 
learning new things. 
WERS: Both/ Either/ Neither 
training and skill development are 
encouraged 
Combination of the variables in the two rows below: 
training paid or organised by the 
employer in the last year 
Employee is asked: During the last 12 months, how much training have 
you had, either paid for or organised by your employer? 
Coded 1 for any training, 0 for none. 
encouragement of skill development 
in the workplace 
Employee is asked: Do you agree or disagree, with the following 
statements about working here? 
people working here are encouraged to develop their skills 
Coded 1 for strongly agree and agree, 0 for the rest. 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Pay practices 
Seniority-based pay 
CER: Use of pay based on tenure in 
the workplace 
Employee is asked: How true is it that the organisation rewards 
employees who have worked there a long time? 
WERS:  Use of pay structures based  
on tenure in the workplace 
HR manager is asked:  Which, if any, of the factors listed on this card 
explain the differences between actual pay levels of fulltime [employees 
in the largest group] at this workplace?  
age of employees, years of service 
Performance-related pay   
CER: Performance-related pay   
Incentive payment based on own 
performance 
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on your own performance? 
Incentive payment based on team 
performance 
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on team performance? 
Incentive payment based on 
company performance 
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on organisational performance? 
WERS: Incidence of performance-
related pay in the workplace 
HR manager is asked: Do any employees at this workplace receive 
payments or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes? 
Individual or group performance-related schemes 
Perceived workplace inequality 
CER:  Pay equality  Employee is asked: Thinking of the highest and the lowest paid people 
at your place of work, how would you describe the gap between their 
pay, as far as you know? Pay gap is much too big /  pay gap is too big / 
pay gap is about right / pay gap is too small / pay gap is much too small 
WERS: Pay equality   HR manager is asked:  Which, if any, of the factors listed on this card 
explain the differences between actual pay levels of fulltime [employees 
in the largest group] at this workplace? None. 
If ‘none’ above, checking again: So, all full-time [employees in the 
largest group] receive the same amount of pay?  
Coded 1 if the answer is Yes. 
Perception of relative income 
CER: Perception of relative income:   Employee is asked: How would you describe wages or salary paid? 
own pay is relatively high / own pay is reasonably similar / own pay is 
relatively low. 
WERS: -  Variable not available in the dataset. 
Job autonomy- influence over 
CER: job tasks  Employee is asked: Do you decide the specific tasks that you carry out 
from day to day or does someone else? 
Coded 1 for employee, 0 for someone else. 
WERS: job tasks  Employee is asked: In general, how much influence do you have about 
the following: the range of tasks you do in your job 
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’. 
CER: pace of work  Employee is asked: Does someone else decide how much work you do 
or how fast you work during the day? 
Coded 1 for employee, 0 for someone else. 
WERS: pace of work  Employee is asked: Employee is asked: In general, how much influence 
do you have about the following:  the pace at which you work 
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’. 
CER: how job is done  Employee is asked: Is yours a job which allows you to design and plan 
important aspects of your own work or is your work largely defined for 
you?  
Coded 1 for yes. 
WERS: how job is done  Employee is asked: Employee is asked: In general, how much influence 
do you have about the following: how you do your work 
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’. 
 
 
   
 